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ABOUT THE INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION PROJECT
Launched in November 2014, this project is addressing a central policy issue of contemporary 
international investment protection law: is investor-state arbitration (ISA) suitable between 
developed liberal democratic countries?
The project will seek to establish how many agreements exist or are planned between 
economically developed liberal democracies. It will review legal and policy reactions to investor-
state arbitrations taking place within these countries and summarize the substantive grounds 
upon which claims are being made and their impact on public policy making by governments.
The project will review, critically assess and critique arguments made in favour and against the 
growing use of ISA between developed democracies — paying particular attention to Canada, 
the European Union, Japan, Korea, the United States and Australia, where civil society groups 
and academic critics have come out against ISA. The project will examine the arguments that 
investor-state disputes are best left to the national courts in the subject jurisdiction. It will also 
examine whether domestic law in the countries examined gives the foreign investor rights of 
action before the domestic courts against the government, equivalent to those provided by 
contemporary investment protection agreements. 
CIGI Senior Fellow Armand de Mestral is the lead researcher on the ISA project. Contributors 
to the project are Marc Bungenberg, Charles-Emmanuel Côté, David Gantz, Shotaro 
Hamamoto, Younsik Kim, Céline Lévesque, Csongor István Nagy, Luke Nottage, Ucheora 
Onwuamaegbu, Carmen Otero, Hugo Perezcano, August Reinisch and David Schneiderman. 
A conference was held in Ottawa on September 25, 2015. The papers presented at that 
conference are in the process of being issued as CIGI Papers and will ultimately appear as a 
collective book. 
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ACRONYMS
BIT  bilateral investment treaty 
BOE  Boletín Oficial del Estado [Offical Gazette]
CETA  Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
CJEU  Court of Justice of the European Union
ECHR  European Court of Human Rights
ECT  Energy Charter Treaty
FADE  Fondo de Titulación del Déficit del Sistema Eléctrico
FITs  feed-in tariffs 
FIPs  feed-in premiums
FTA  free trade agreement
ICSID  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
IPAs  investment protection agreements
RD  Royal Decree [Real Decreto]
RDL  Royal Decree Law [Real Decreto Ley]
STC  Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional 
STS  Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo
TTIP  Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

SPAIN ANd INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: ThE RENEwABLE ENERGy ExPLOSION
CARMEN OTERO GARCÍA CASTRILLÓN • 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The generous Spanish incentive system for investments in the production of electricity from renewable 
energies, which was established in 2004 and expanded in 2007, attracted foreign and national investors 
and led to an increase in the production of electricity from renewable energies. However, in the context 
of a profound economic crisis and the consequent reduction of electricity consumption, the incentives 
began to cause a tariff deficit (the difference between the regulated tariff collection and the associated 
real costs) in the electricity system that the Spanish government addressed through progressive 
cutbacks to the incentives from 2010, up to their elimination in 2013.
The changes in the Spanish incentive regime caused significant losses for both foreign and national 
investors. As a result, these investors implemented diversified legal strategies to defend their interests. 
While international investors turned to investment arbitration, national investors could only present 
their claims before Spanish courts. The result was a potential for differential treatment between national 
and foreign investors.
This paper examines the incentive regime and the government’s changes to it in order to understand 
the investors’ claims and the reasoning that resulted in their rejections, both in national courts and in 
the only arbitration award issued up to now. The paper concludes with a discussion of the effect of the 
renewable energies situation on the investment arbitration debate within Spanish civil society.
INTRODUCTION
Spain is a party to a number of investment protection agreements (IPAs).1 When the agreements were 
signed, they were aimed at protecting major Spanish companies’ investments in emerging or developing 
economies. However, in recent years, the situation has been turned upside down because Spain has 
become one of the states against which a great number of arbitrations have been initiated. Foreign 
investors have resorted to different investment arbitration fora in response to the drastic reduction 
of public investment incentives that were adopted in 2004 and 2007 to promote the production of 
electricity from renewable energies.
The public incentives for the production of electricity from renewable energies (biomass, wind, 
geothermal, hydraulic, maritime and solar technologies) strongly stimulated national and foreign 
investment because, with the incentives, there were good prospects for obtaining significant profits. 
When the national situation changed as a consequence of the global economic crisis, and the national 
economic deficit increased exponentially, in the electricity sector in particular, public authorities could 
not sustain the established incentives. The economic deficit in the Spanish electricity system was due 
in large part to the number of incentives that had been given to renewable energy facilities, which were 
also increasingly improving their competitiveness through technological development. The cuts to the 
incentives were implemented progressively, albeit in a disorganized way. The regulatory scene became 
more and more difficult to understand until 2013, when the incentives were completely eliminated and 
a partially defined exceptional regime to support the production of electricity from renewable energies 
was introduced. The new regime was far less generous than the previous one.
The result is a mismatched juridical situation, with a number of investor claims before Spanish national 
courts, as well as before international arbitration tribunals. There was even an attempt to have the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) adjudicate alleged infringements of fundamental rights 
arising from Spain’s renewable energies measures, but the application was rejected due to its lack of 
compliance with admissibility criteria. The increasing number of international investment arbitration 
cases against Spain, which are of major economic relevance, have raised great legal interest. This 
paper aims to provide an overview of the circumstances that led Spain to become a major defendant 
in investment arbitration claims. In this context, the paper will also reflect on the parallels between 
the resulting national court cases and international arbitration proceedings — as of July 2016, only 
one arbitration award had been given — that have dealt with investors’ claims that Spain violated its 
obligations regarding legal certainty, the protection of legitimate expectations and the proscription 
against retroactivity. Through a discussion of this ongoing situation, this paper also presents the legal 
1 The IPAs are available online: <www.comercio.es/acuerdos>.
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scenario of the alleged discrimination between foreign and national investors under the investment 
arbitration system, in particular between developed democracies.
SPANISH RENEWABLE ENERGIES CONFLICTS
Spanish Law 54/19972 on the electricity sector established a system to support the production of 
electricity from renewable energies that differed from the system that applied to electricity obtained 
from fossil energy sources. Royal Decree (RD) 2818/19983 established the first regime for the production 
of electricity by facilities supplied by renewable energies. The system was extended by RD 436/2004,4 
and later abrogated by RD 661/2007,5 which introduced an increasingly rewarding incentive regime 
for the production of electricity from renewable energies. The 2007 RD fostered national and foreign 
investments, in particular in the solar photovoltaic and thermoelectric sectors.
The special regime covered the production of electricity in facilities with an installed capacity of less 
than 50 MW of power that used renewable energies, waste or other means — such as cogeneration 
— as their primary source, applying a highly efficient and energy-saving technology. The reasons 
for rewarding this type of production were based on its clear advantages, including the reduction of 
contaminants and greenhouse gases, which would help Spain comply with its EU and Kyoto Protocol 
objectives; reduction of environmental impacts, since renewable energies are cleaner and do not 
generate waste that is difficult and costly to process; increased energy supply security and reduced 
dependence on foreign energy; the inexhaustible character of renewable energies, due to their natural 
regeneration or the nature of the source; and savings in primary energy and in electricity transport and 
distribution, due to the proximity between generation and consumption locations.
European Union Normative Framework
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union6 states that the European Union’s energy policy 
aims to promote energy efficiency and energy savings, together with the development of new and 
renewable forms of energy.7 This is also important for reaching the environmental and climate objectives 
of the European Commission’s Europe 2020 Strategy.8 Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the 
use of energy from renewable sources establishes an overall policy for the production and promotion 
of energy from renewable sources in the European Union.9 The directive imposes on member states 
obligations of transparency, accountability, programming and the adoption of national systems that 
support the use of renewable energies but, within the directive’s framework, member states are free to 
implement their own systems. In any case, the directive does not prohibit member states from limiting 
their incentive programs for the national production of electricity from renewable energies.
The commission has shown an interest in harmonizing national incentive systems by progressively 
eliminating feed-in tariffs (FITs) that protect renewable energy generation facilities against market 
price changes and concentrating on feed-in premiums (FIPs) and other assisting instruments, such 
as quota obligations, that force producers to respond to market prices. Member states are invited to 
provide these incentives through competitive bidding procedures because these procedures would 
provide them with information on the different technologies, projects and operators’ costs with respect 
to specific locations. Hence, healthy competition was to be stimulated not only between electricity 
2 Law 54/1997, 27 November, on the electricity sector (BOE No 285, 35097 (28 November 1997)), online: <https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.
php?id=BOE-A-1997-25340>.
3 Royal Decree [Real Decreto] (RD) 2818/1998, 23 December, on the production of electricity in facilities supplied by renewable energy sources, 
waste and cogeneration (BOE No 312, 44077 (30 December 1998)), online: <https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-1998-30041>.
4 RD 436/2004, 12 March, on the methodology to actualize and systematize the economic and legal regime of electricity production activity under 
the special regime (BOE No 75, 13217 (27 March 2004)), online: <https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2004-5562>.
5 RD 661/2007, 25 May, on the regulation of the electricity production under the special regime (BOE No 126, 22846 (26 May 2007)), online: 
<https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2007-10556>.
6 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, [2008] OJ C 115/47. An English language consolidated version of the treaty is available 
online: <eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT>.
7 Ibid, art 194(1)(c).
8 EC, Commission, Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020: A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth, 
COM(2010) 2020 final (Brussels: European Commission, 2010), online: <ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20BARROSO%20
%20%20007%20-%20Europe%202020%20-%20EN%20version.pdf>.
9 EC, Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from 
Renewable Sources and Amending and Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, [2009] OJ, L 140/16 [Directive 
2009/28/EC], online: <eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32009L0028>.
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providers but also between the energy source providers (i.e., solar power, wind power, and so on).10 
This new approach has already been inserted into the European Commission’s guidelines on state aid 
for environmental protection and energy.11
Spanish Incentive Regime
The objectives of the incentive regime were to guarantee to the owners of the facilities under the special 
regime a reasonable return for their investment, as well as to promote their participation in the market 
and to assign a reasonable portion of the costs of the electricity system to electricity consumers. 
The regime was very generous because the various incentives were cumulative. The incentives consisted 
of the fixed tariff, the FIT, at the introduction of the electricity generated from renewable energy into 
the network and the additional premium, the FIP, on the price obtained in the market when selling the 
electricity.12 Therefore, the owners could opt (for periods of not less than one year) between selling their 
electricity at a regulated tariff (unique for all the programming periods), directly selling this energy in 
the daily or due-date markets or selling through bilateral contracts (through which they would receive 
the agreed-upon price, plus a premium). In the last situation, maximum and minimum amounts were 
established for the addition of a premium in relation to the daily price in certain technologies. This 
premium was not added when the market price was high enough to guarantee cost coverage, but was 
added to the price when the income derived from the market price was too low (FIP with cap and floor 
prices).
With respect to the installed power objective, RD 661/2007 established a target of 371 MW for 
photovoltaic solar energy facilities (subgroup b.1.1) and 500 MW for thermoelectric solar power 
facilities (subgroup b.1.2). However, in fact, installed power in photovoltaic solar technology 
increased and, in order to provide continuity and meet expectations for investments in this sector, the 
target was increased by RD 1578/2008.13 This new objective was to be reset on an annual basis and 
progressively increased in coordination with the evolution of technology improvements (rather than 
setting the market limits for this technology on the basis of the total power accumulated annually). 
These changes had to be accompanied by a new economic regime to stimulate technological evolution 
and Spanish competitiveness in photovoltaic facilities in the medium and long terms. Photovoltaic 
facilities registered from September 29, 2008, could only opt for a regulated tariff for up to 25 years. 
This regime was very favourable for foreign investment, and major projects were initiated in Spain. A 
similar process took place in other EU member states with different incentives,14 but the Spanish regime 
was the most generous.15
10 EC, Commission, Communication from the Commission, Delivering the internal electricity market and making the most of public intervention, 
COM(2013) 7243 final (Brussels: European Commission, 2013), online: <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/com_2013_
public_intervention_en.pdf>; and an accompanying document, Commission Staff Working Document, European Commission guidance for 
the design of renewables support schemes, SWD (2013) 439 final (Brussels: European Commission, 2013) [EC Guidance], online: <https://
ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/com_2013_public_intervention_swd04_en.pdf>.
11 EC, Commission, Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020, [2014] 
OJ, C 200/1, online: <eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014XC0628(01)>.
12 For a general perspective on the EU member states’ use of incentive regimes in the production of energy through renewable sources, see Arne 
Klein et al, Evaluation of Different Feed-in Tariff Design Options: Best Practice Paper for the International Feed-In Cooperation (2010), online: 
<www.feed-in-cooperation.org/wDefault_7/content/research/index.php>; Mario Ragwitz et al, Recent Developments of Feed-in Systems in the 
EU: A Research Paper for the International Feed-In Cooperation (January 2012) [Ragwitz, Recent Developments], online: <www.feed-in-
cooperation.org/wDefault_7/content/research/index.php>; Anne Held et al, Design Features of Support Schemes for Renewable Electricity (The 
Netherlands: Ecofys, 2014), online: <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014_design_features_of_support_schemes.pdf>. 
The most complete analysis can be found in EC Guidance, supra note 10. 
13 RD 1578/2008, 26 September, on the payment of the production of electricity by photovoltaic solar technology in facilities established after the 
final date for payment given by RD 661/2007, 25 May (BOE No 234, 39117 (27 September 2008)), online: <https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.
php?id=BOE-A-2008-15595>.
14 Nine EU member states in 2009, 18 in 2005 and up to 24 in 2012 used this kind of measure (for example, Germany, Italy, Czech Republic, 
France, Slovakia). The most used systems were FIT, first, and FIP when the renewable energies were improving their competitiveness. Other 
states used only FIP (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). See Ragwitz et al, supra note 12 at 9–16. See 
also European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, The Support of Electricity From Renewable Energy Sources, accompanying 
document to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from 
Renewable Sources, COM(2008) 19 final, SEC(2008) 57 (Brussels: European Commission, 2008), online: <eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52008SC0057>.
15 See Julieta Schallenberg-Rodriguez & Reinhard Haas, “Fixed Feed-in Tariff Versus Premium: A Review of the Current Spanish System” (2012) 
16:1 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Rev 293.
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Spanish Cutbacks
The generous Spanish incentive system attracted foreign and national investors, which led to an 
increase in the production of electricity from renewable energies. However, in the context of a profound 
economic crisis and the consequent reduction of electricity consumption, the incentives began to cause 
a tariff deficit (the difference between the regulated tariff collection and the associated real costs) in the 
electricity system, which the Spanish government addressed through its progressive cutbacks.
The first measure was Royal Decree Law (RDL) 6/2009,16 which explained that the special regime had 
led to a tariff deficit and that this was causing huge problems, risking not only the financial situation 
of electricity companies but also the sustainability of the whole sector. The financial security of the 
investments required to maintain a quality electricity supply was seriously deteriorating. Hence, a 
payments pre-allocation registry was created to provide information about the projected investment 
facilities’ compliance with the legal requirements, their power volume and their impact on the electricity 
tariffs and their schedules. Moreover, this RDL established a mechanism to finance the accumulated 
deficit by transferring collection rights to a fund (Fondo de Titulación del Déficit del Sistema Eléctrico 
[FADE]) and allocating the ownership of the collection rights that were in the hands of the fund by 
selling them to third parties through a competitive mechanism.
Under the same reasoning, and relying on the success of the Spanish photovoltaic sector, which was 
the world’s largest photovoltaic market in 2008, RD 1003/201017 established a procedure to ensure that 
facilities were properly accredited before they could opt for the incentives. After September 29, 2008, it 
was no longer possible for new facilities to access the regime.
Additional cutbacks to the incentive system were introduced by RD 1614/2010,18 which limited the 
bonus working hours for thermoelectric and wind technologies, and RDL 14/2010,19 which reduced 
certain revenues and cost consignments and adopted consumer protection measures in order to 
prevent further deficits, beginning in 2013. The limit on bonus working hours was introduced for 
photovoltaic solar energy producers, implying, in practice, the retroactive elimination of the regulated 
tariff regime.20 In addition, producers were assessed a fee for access to the transmission grid on the 
basis of their activities’ incidence in the development of transportation and distribution networks. 
Later, RDL 1/201221 stated that the high development of solar energy revealed an imbalance between 
production costs and the value of the solar technologies’ bonus. Acknowledging that previous cutbacks 
had not been enough to eliminate the tariff deficit, the RDL cut the incentive regime for facilities under 
the special regime and suspended the payments’ pre-allocation procedure for those facilities that 
had not yet been registered.22 Considering the government’s leeway with respect to meeting power 
objectives under the renewable energies Plan 2020,23 and due to the difficult economic and financial 
situation, incentives were eliminated at least until the principal threat to the economic sustainability 
of the electricity system — the tariff deficit — was resolved. Under the new economic scenario, it was 
16 Royal Decree Law (RDL) [Real Decreto Ley] 6/2009, 30 April, on the adoption of certain measures in the energy sector and the approval of the 
social bond (BOE No 111, 39404 (7 May 2009)), online: <https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2009-7581>.
17 RD 1003/2010, 5 August, on the liquidation of the equivalent premium to the facilities producing electricity from photovoltaic technology under 
the special regime (BOE No 190, 68610 (6 August 2010)), online: <https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2010-12622>.
18 RD 1614/2010, 7 December, on the regulation and modification of certain aspects of the production of electricity from solar thermoelectric and 
wind technologies (BOE No 298, 101853 (8 December 2010)), online: <https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2010-18915>. 
19 RDL 14/2010, 23 December, on urgent measures to correct the tariff deficit in the electricity sector (BOE No 312, 106386 (24 December 2010)), 
online: <https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2010-19757>. 
20 The reference values for calculating the payments were expressly established and, in order to guarantee the reasonableness of the payments, the 
deadline for certain facilities (subgroup b.1.1. — photovoltaic solar energy) was extended from 25 (RD 661/2007, supra note 5) to 28 years. 
Later, Law 2/2011, 4 March, on economic sustainability (BOE No 55, 25033 (5 March 2011)), online: <https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.
php?id=BOE-A-2011-4117>, extended this period from 28 to 30 years.
21 RDL 1/2012, 27 March, on the suspension of the pre-allocation payment procedures and the abolition of the economic incentives for new 
electricity production facilities from cogeneration, renewable energies and waste (BOE No 24, 8068 (28 January 2012)), online: <https://www.
boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2012-1310>, provided that the cost of the system had risen to €2 billion in 2010 and that it could rise to €2 
billion annually from 2014.
22 The reasons for this decision were the need to hold back the tariff deficit, the existence of sufficient generating capacity to satisfy the demand 
forecasted for the next few years and, therefore, the absence of a need to continue with the annual rate of implementation of the renewable 
technologies to reach the objectives established in the Renewable Energies Plan 2020, with respect to which the government enjoyed some 
leeway: Plan de Acción Nacional de Energías Renovables de España 2011—2020 (PANER) [Spain’s National Renewable Energies Action Plan, 
2011–2020 (NREAP)] (2010), Spanish version online: <www.minetur.gob.es/energia/desarrollo/EnergiaRenovable/Documents/20100630_
PANER_Espanaversion_final.pdf>.
23 Ibid.
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necessary to implement a new payment model for these technologies in order to promote the efficient 
allocation of resources through market mechanisms.
The electricity tariff deficit situation worsened because the income from consumer usage had dropped, 
due to the lower consumption associated with the economic crisis and the price increases caused by 
the special regime’s increasing incentives. Because raising the consumer price was seen as inadvisable 
during the economic crisis, the Spanish government opted instead to reduce the system’s costs by 
eliminating FIP incentives (the amount paid to renewable energy producers selling their electricity in 
the market) through RDL 2/2013.24 Hence, these producers could only turn to the FIT option, and the 
annual opportunity to opt for one or the other was suppressed. Due to the extraordinary and urgent 
need to act, the measure was applied immediately.25
Despite all these measures, the Spanish electricity system continued to have an untenable tariff deficit 
(an accumulated debt of €26,062.51 million in May 2013).26 The adoption of RDL 9/201327 enabled 
the government to approve a new legal and economic regime for the facilities producing electricity 
through renewable energy sources. The new regime was based on the producers obtaining the benefits 
derived from involvement in the market, plus (if necessary) income to compensate for the investment 
costs that an efficient and well-administered company could not recover from the market. This implied 
an FIP incentive system, complemented by additional bonuses to guarantee a reasonable profitability. 
Calculation of the specific bonus would be made on the basis of a standard facility, the income obtained 
from selling the energy at the production market price, the exploitation costs and the value of the initial 
investment. The amount would therefore depend on the concept of reasonable profitability, defined as 
that which will vary based on the average performance of the state’s secondary 10-year bond market, 
applying the appropriate differential. In order to maintain the reasonable profitability principle, these 
parameters could be reviewed every six years.
This new regime expressly derogated the regime established by RD 661/200728 and its modifications. 
The existing incentive regime was to be applied until all the necessary implementing legislation was 
adopted. There would be a liquidation settlement for the facilities on the basis of the transition regime 
and, later, on the basis of the new regime, the facilities would be regularized with (retroactive) effect 
from this law’s entry into force. On the other hand, those facilities that, at the date of the law’s entry 
into force, had the right to benefit from the primary economic regime were given profits before taxes 
that varied based on the average return of the state bonds in the secondary 10-year bond market, plus 
300 basic points, in a system that, again, could be reviewed every six years.
RDL 2/201329 implied the retroactive elimination of the generous incentives established in 2004 with 
an annual option between FIT or FIP. Law 24/201330 on the electricity sector confirmed the situation. 
The law aimed at guaranteeing the electricity supply at the necessary level of quality and with the 
minimum possible cost to ensure the system’s economic and financial sustainability, while allowing 
for an effective level of competition within the principles of environmental protection in a modern 
society. The abolished regime was said to have lost its purpose due to the high penetration of the new 
productive technologies based on renewable energy sources. Hence, the new technologies were treated 
in a manner similar to other technologies and the difference between the ordinary and special regimes 
for electricity production disappeared. An exception was that the law allowed for the establishment of 
a new specific payment regime to stimulate production from renewable energy sources if there was an 
EU obligation to reach energy objectives or if implementation of a new regime would entail a reduction 
24 RDL 2/2013, 1 February, on urgent measures for the national electricity and financial systems (BOE No 29, 9072 (2 February 2013)), online: 
<https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2013-1117>.
25 Article 86 of the Spanish Constitution (SC) [Constitución Española], BOE No 311, 29 December 1978, online: <www.tribunalconstitucional.
es/en/constitucion/Pages/ConstitucionIngles.aspx>, allows the government to act in extraordinary circumstances: “1. In case of extraordinary 
and urgent need, the Government may issue temporary legislative provisions which shall take the form of decree-laws and which may not affect 
the legal system of the basic State institutions, the rights, duties and freedoms of the citizens contained in Title 1, the system of the Autonomous 
Communities, or the general electoral law.”
26 RDL 9/2013, 12 July, on the adoption of urgent measures to guarantee the financial stability of the electricity system (BOE No 167, 52106 (13 
July 2013)), online: <https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2013-7705>. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See RD 661/2007, supra note 5.
29 RDL 2/2013, supra note 24.
30 Law 24/2013, 26 December on the electricity sector (BOE No 310, 105198 (27 December 2013)), online: <https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.
php?id=BOE-A-2013-13645>.
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of energy costs and external energy dependence. The new regime was implemented by RD 413/201431 
and the corresponding ministerial order.32
The Spanish National Stock Market Commission calculated that the new FIP regime would entail a 
reduction of approximately €1.7 billion in the regulated income of the overall facilities, although the 
impact would vary according to the technology and the facility type as well as the already cashed 
income. The older facilities would experience greater reductions or even lose the specific payments and 
obtain only the market price. Wind facilities comprised more than one third of the global adjustment; 
their income was reduced by around €600 million. This was followed by photovoltaic technology, with 
a reduction of less than €400 million, and, finally, solar-thermoelectric, cogeneration, waste treatment 
and hydraulic production, with reductions of between €150 million and €200 million each.33
To summarize, the Spanish strategy of providing incentives for renewable energies has been chaotic 
and caused a tremendous regulatory risk. When the cost overruns of the system, the tariff deficit and 
the extra income for the facilities’ owners (whose incentives were calculated when the technologies, 
in particular photovoltaic and thermosolar, were less competitive) became apparent, successive 
normative changes took place from 2010 onward that caused significant losses to both foreign and 
national investors. As a result of these changes, foreign and national investors implemented diverse 
legal strategies to defend their interests. While international investors were able to turn to investment 
arbitration, national investors could present their claims only before Spanish courts. Because the facts 
that led to the claims, whether national or foreign, were the same, the investors experienced equally 
the consequences of the legislative changes. In both venues, violations of the legal certainty and the 
legitimate expectations principles were the basic legal arguments against the Spanish administration. 
This paper surveys the way in which this conflict has been addressed by the Spanish courts. The courts’ 
response to the national investors’ claims could be compared to the treatment of foreign investors by 
arbitration tribunals.
Spanish Supreme Court and Constitutional Court Approaches 
Spanish investors cannot resort directly to investment arbitration. Therefore, they turned to national 
courts for administrative issues to challenge all the normative changes that had reduced, and finally 
eliminated, the special incentive regime, claiming damages. Additionally, and in parallel, the Spanish 
Constitutional Court has had to face constitutionality claims regarding the changes to the system.34 
While the first type of case is always initiated by investors and aims at obtaining damages, the 
second type is initiated by political or administrative authorities, aiming to obtain a declaration of 
non-constitutionality. Although they have different origins and purposes, both types of cases allege 
the violation of the legal certainty and legitimate expectations principles that are protected by the 
Spanish Constitution.35 In the cases initiated by political or administrative authorities, the violation 
of the constitutional principle of normative hierarchy was also alleged, with the parties arguing the 
31 RD 413/2014, June 6 on electrical generation by means of renewable, cogeneration and waste facilities (BOE No 140, 43876 (10 June 2014)), 
online: <https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2014-6123>. 
32 Ministerial Order IET/1045/2014, 16 June, adopting the remuneration parameters for the facility type applicable to certain energy production 
facilities from renewable energies, cogeneration and waste (BOE No 150, 46430 (June 20, 2014)), online: <https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.
php?id=BOE-A-2014-6495>. The exceptional FIP incentives cover the investment costs that an efficient and well-administered company could 
not recover in the market. In particular, on top of the income from selling energy in the market, the facilities could receive, during their regulatory 
lives, an additional specific income integrated by an amount for installed power unit covering investment costs that cannot be recovered by each 
facility type through selling the energy in the market (the so-called “payment for investment”) and another amount for the operation covering, 
if necessary, the difference between the exploitation costs and the revenues for participating in the facility type (the so-called “payment for the 
operation”). There was a complex classification of facility types on the basis of the technology used, installed power, age of the facility, electricity 
system and any other segmentation considered necessary to apply the regime. Each facility type had particular payment parameters that would 
determine its specific payment regime.
33 Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia, Report of the Markets and Competition National Commission on the Ministerial Order 
Proposal, ENER/37/2014/EE (3 April 2014) at 8. 
34 Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional (STC) 96/2014, 12 June (BOE No 162, 99 (4 July 2014)) [STC 96/2014]; STCs 109/2014, 26 June (BOE 
No 177, 139 (22 July 2014)) and 110/2014, 26 June (BOE No 177, 150 (22 July 1914)); STC 48/2015, 5 March (BOE No 85, 191 (12 April 
2015)); STCs 105/2015, 28 May (BOE No 159, 55643 (4 July 2015)) and 106/2015, 28 May (BOE No 159, 55651 (4 July 2015)); STC 270/2015, 
17 December (BOE No 19, 6370 (22 January 2016)) [STC 270/2015]; STC 19/2016, 4 February (BOE No 57, 18530 (7 March 2015)); STCs 
29/2016, 18 February (BOE No 71, 21753 (23 March 2016)) and 30/2016, 18 February (BOE No 71, 21767 (23 March 2016)); and STC 42/16, 
3. March (BOE No 85, 25049 (8 April 2016)). 
35 SC, supra note 25, art 9(3): “The Constitution guarantees the principle of legality, the hierarchy of legal provisions, the publicity of legal 
enactments, the non-retroactivity of punitive measures that are unfavourable to or restrict individual rights, the certainty that the rule of law will 
prevail, the accountability of the public authorities, and the prohibition of arbitrary action on the part of the latter.”
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infringement of articles 10 (promotion, protection and treatment of investments) and 13 (expropriation) 
of the Energy Charter Treaty36 (ECT) as a superior normative instrument since Spanish reception of 
international law corresponds to a monist system.37 However, international norms are not parameters 
of constitutionality and the Constitutional Court could not evaluate the eventual infringement of those 
rules by the internal laws — and, therefore, the violation of the normative hierarchy constitutional 
principle — since the claim did not include any reasoning on the substantive incompatibility between 
the ECT articles referred to above and the national provisions supposedly infringing them.38
The Spanish Supreme Court has already been called upon to decide a number of cases concerning the 
incentive regime.39 Up to now, its pronouncements have dealt with the reductions to the incentive regime 
and have recently covered its suppression through RDs 1578/200840 and 1614/2010;41 RDLs 14/2010,42 
1/201243 and 2/2013;44 and Law 2/2011.45 Moreover, the Spanish Constitutional Court has faced a 
number of constitutionality claims regarding the norms implementing the incentive regime changes, 
in particular RDLs 14/2010 and 9/2013.46 The Spanish Council of State47 expressed its agreement with 
the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the norms introducing the incentive reductions (RDs 1578/2008 
and 1614/2010 and RDL 14/2010) and, while acknowledging the difference between reduction and 
elimination, considered that the court’s reasoning could equally be extended to the elimination of the 
incentive regime (RDLs 1/2012 and 2/2013).
Despite the parties’ claims, the Supreme Court has considered it unnecessary to present preliminary 
questions before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) about either the interpretation 
of Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources,48 or the 
interpretation of the ECT49 and its Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects,50 
on the basis that the questions were misguided and the court had no doubt about the issues. The 
court also responded negatively to the possibility of presenting a preliminary question regarding the 
EU principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations,51 on the basis that the 
reduction of the incentives did not affect these principles because the remunerative system could not be 
permanently immune to normative changes and the sustainability of the electricity system justified the 
changes. In any case, the Supreme Court decisions rely on CJEU case law for the interpretation of the 
legal certainty principle and its corollary, the protection of legitimate expectations principle, as much 
as on Spanish jurisprudence. In this regard, the CJEU has stated that “the principle of legal certainty 
does not require that there be no legislative amendment, requiring as it does, rather, that the legislature 
36 Energy Charter Treaty, 17 December 1994, 2080 UNTS 95; 34 ILM 360 (entered into force 16 April 1998).
37 SC, supra note 25, art 96.
38 On this issue, STC 270/2015, supra note 34, includes a dissenting opinion signed by three magistrates. They regretted the missed opportunity 
to reflect on the control of constitutionality (according to the legality principle of SC article 9) based on the contradiction with an international 
obligation. International treaty norms creating Spanish obligations can be parameters for abstract constitutionality control of a national legal 
norm. The magistrates argued that the national rules infringe the legitimate expectations principle established not only in the constitution (as a 
dimension of the legal certainty principle) but also in the ECT.
39 Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo (STS) 2320/2012, 12 April; STS 4253/2012, 19 June; STS 4594/2012, 26 June; STS 3365/2013, 25 June. This 
jurisprudence is reported in STS 1/2014, 13 January; STS 1284/2014, 3 April; STS 117/2013, 15 July; STS 1720/2015, 20 April; STSs 261/2014, 
262/2015, 20 April; STS 4785/2015, 16 November; STS 5379/2015, 9 December; STSs 5373, 5374/2015, 10 December; STSs 5478, 5479/2015, 
11 December; STS 5495/2015, 15 December; STSs 5552, 5486, 5492, 5493/2015, 16 December; STSs 10, 67, 69, 72/2016, 21 January. 
40 RD 1578/2008, supra note 13.
41 RD 1614/2010, supra note 18. 
42 RDL 14/2010, supra note 19. 
43 RDL 1/2012, supra note 21. 
44 RDL 2/2013, supra note 24. 
45 Law 2/2011, supra note 20. 
46 RDL 9/2013, supra note 26. 
47 Council of State, Opinion on the ante-project of the law on the electricity sector, CE-D-2013-937 (12 September 2013), online: <boe.es/buscar/
doc.php?id=CE-D-2013-937>.
48 Directive 2009/28/EC, supra note 9 at 16–62. 
49 ECT, supra note 36. 
50 Ibid.
51 The question would have been: “Should the legitimate expectations principle be interpreted since it is opposed to a modification in the 
remuneration scheme of a renewable energies plant once the investment for its construction has already been made and it has been recognized 
for a specific remuneration during a specified number of years?”
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take account of the particular situations of traders and provide, where appropriate, adaptations to the 
application of the new legal rules.”52
In the view of the Supreme Court, the reasonable profitability principle applies to the full life of 
the facility but does not guarantee that, throughout the entire period, the investments will attain 
reasonable profitability. The changes in the regime are not considered to be prejudicial to the reasonable 
profitability principle. The court has stated, in any case, that the stability and predictability of the energy 
regulatory framework need to be respected in order to promote the development of technologies for 
the production of energy from renewable sources, to make them more efficient, to generate economic 
and labour opportunities and to guarantee the security of investments.
As to the principle of the security and protection of legitimate expectations,53 the Supreme Court 
has stated that the principle has not been infringed, for the following reasons: the FIT is only one of 
the incentive measures adopted by public authorities and its evaluation has to be done jointly; the 
facilities’ owners do not have an unchangeable right to the unaltered maintenance of the economic 
regime establishing their remuneration when they have opted not to go to the market (a possibility 
that is always open to them); the elimination of the entrepreneurial risk is counterbalanced with the 
possibility of the measures being altered when there is a change in circumstances, and this is a factor 
that the owners knew or should have known; the incentive regime rests on a series of implicit bases 
that any diligent operator could not ignore, such as the fact that the incentive measures cannot be 
considered perpetual or unlimited in time (for example, the premium after 25 years implicitly referred 
to the useful life of the facility); and the incentive regime responded to an estimation of electric power 
objectives for renewable sources. Under this reasoning, the Supreme Court stated that legal certainty 
is not in conflict with a modification of the legal regime, even if, from the protection of investments 
perspective, stability of the regulatory framework for economic activity is desirable. Interpreting 
legal certainty as a curb to normative modifications is particularly inappropriate in a sector such as 
renewable energy that, due to its innovative character, requires adaptations that parallel the evolution 
of general economic circumstances and the technological and economic characteristics of the activity. 
Adjustments and corrections introduced by the government are, therefore, not contrary to the legal 
certainty principle.
The Supreme Court considered that the legitimate expectations of the investors were not infringed either, 
since the limitation of an initially established payment/incentive regime for all renewable energies was 
predictable, in particular with the economic crisis experienced since 2007. The introduction of certain 
changes in the regulatory system was a reasonable measure to mitigate its excess costs.
In a similar line of reasoning, the Spanish Constitutional Court54 established that the normative changes 
introduced by RDL 9/201355 could not be challenged on the basis of the legitimate expectations principle 
because the principle does not absolutely protect regulatory stability or immutability, in particular 
in the context of economic difficulties and the deficit increase experienced in the electricity sector. 
The legal certainty principle and its corollary, the legitimate expectations principle, do not entail the 
claimants’ right to maintenance of the existing regulation for an economic sector at a particular moment. 
Regulatory stability is compatible with normative changes when the changes are foreseeable and clearly 
in the general public interest. This was the situation at issue; although the measures were adopted as 
emergency measures, in the existing circumstances, they could not be considered unforeseeable by a 
reasonable, diligent and prudent operator. The norms are clear regarding the situations affected and 
the legal effects; hence, there is no uncertainty as to their scope. In addition, the energy sector, as with 
several others, is subject to intense administrative intervention due to its significance to the general 
public interest. The need to protect the general public interest when circumstances change makes it 
52 Plantanol GmbH & Co KG, C-201/08, [2009] ECR I-08343 at para 49, online: <eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62008CJ0201>. 
The court stated:  
[T]he general principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations do not in principle preclude a Member State, with regard to 
a product such as the one at issue in the main proceedings, from withdrawing, before the expiry date initially laid down in the national rules, a tax 
exemption scheme which applied to such products. In any event, such a withdrawal does not require the presence of exceptional circumstances. 
However, it is for the national court to consider, in the context of an overall assessment in the specific case, whether those principles have been 
respected in the main proceedings by taking account of all relevant circumstances relating to the case (ibid at para 68).
53 SC, supra note 25, art 9(3). 
54 STC 270/2015, supra note 34.
55 RDL 9/2013, supra note 26. 
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unfeasible to assert the permanency and unalterability of the rules. The legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations principles do not allow the enshrinement of rights under the existing rules and, obviously, 
cannot impede the introduction of sudden legislative changes in emergency cases. 
In a dissenting opinion,56 three magistrates of the Constitutional Court, although agreeing with the final 
conclusion of the court’s decision, stated that they would have wished to see the legitimate expectations 
issue analyzed in a more detailed way, in particular considering the existence of numerous investment 
arbitration proceedings against Spain alleging the infringement of this principle. The same desire for a 
wider and more reflexive analysis was expressed with respect to fair and equitable treatment accorded 
in the ECT. Despite the “partially different meaning”57 this treatment may assume in international 
economic and investment law when applied by international courts, it is understood to be included 
in the constitutional legitimate expectations principle. In this regard, the dissenting magistrates 
emphasized the careful arguments provided in the Supreme Court decisions. 
In the dissenting magistrates’ view, the essential elements of the legitimate expectations analysis in 
the case are the following: the evaluation of the incentive system as a whole (tariffs are only a part 
of it); whether the advantages of avoiding market risks implied in the regulated tariffs regime is 
counterbalanced by the regulatory risk derived from the sudden need to react in certain circumstances 
in order to address superior public interests; investors’ diligence in analyzing the implicit conditions of 
these kinds of public incentives; and the influence that achieving the targeted objectives should have 
on the incentive regime.
For a well-founded reasoning that could have led to a solid constitutional doctrine on the legitimate 
expectations principle, it would have been necessary to develop the constitutional meaning of legitimate 
expectations as an integral element of the principles of legal certainty and the interdiction against 
retroactivity of restrictive norms, together with the principle of the responsibility of public authorities 
and the prohibition against their arbitrary actions; and, in accordance with the resulting standards, 
to proceed to a meticulous analysis of the contested norms, adequately balancing all the concurrent 
elements. In this regard, the CJEU has dealt with legitimate expectations and, therefore, its approach 
can serve as a guide. The elements that should be balanced are the following: the legitimate expectations 
of interested parties must derive from concrete acts that objectively create such expectations and 
that provide specific, unconditional and coherent guarantees in accordance with the applicable law; 
economic operators cannot have legitimate expectations in the continuation of a situation that is subject 
to the discretionary exercise of power by public authorities, in particular in areas that require constant 
adaptation to economic circumstances or that respond to exceptional or transitory situations, as well as 
to the need to act in the general public interest; the unpredictability of the normative changes that led to 
the eventual frustration of the legitimate expectations of a prudent operator when taking into account 
the market or economic sector circumstances; and the normative changes must take into consideration 
the specific situations of those economic operators and provide adaptations that minimize, compensate 
or rebalance the frustrated legitimate expectations through substitute measures proportionate to the 
stated objectives.
Another argument used was that the prohibition against arbitrary action by public authorities58 had 
been breached. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the government’s changed 
course of action did not constitute a reversal contrary to the public interest. Rather, the course of 
action was aimed at avoiding the negative impact of previous decisions on the sustainability of the 
electricity production system. Along similar lines, the Spanish Constitutional Court dismissed the 
unconstitutionality claims regarding the violation of article 86 of the SC because the constitutional 
requirement of an extraordinary and urgent need for government action through an RDL was explicit 
and reasoned and the adopted measures were directly connected to the difficult situation that had to 
be faced.59 
Finally, the Supreme Court did not see any violation of the principle under which rules that restrict 
rights cannot have retroactive effect. The forbidden retroactivity principle does not apply to norms 
56 STC 270/2015, supra note 34. 
57 Ibid.
58 SC, supra note 25, art 9(3). 
59 STC 96/2014, supra note 34.
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that do not alter or revisit what has already happened (legal effects that have already occurred are 
not annulled) but have an immediate effect, although this may entail having an effect on an ongoing 
situation. Because the effects of the modifications are to take place in the future, the modifications do 
not fall within the forbidden retroactivity principle. The prohibition would apply, for example, if the 
new norms obliged the parties to return already received amounts, but it does not apply when the 
new norms establish that the payments will cease in 30 years. A similar reasoning has been applied 
by the Constitutional Court.60 The interdiction against retroactivity in strict terms only applies to 
consolidated rights. Therefore, this prohibition applies to regulations that affect confirmed relationships 
and exhausted situations. In these cases, retroactivity could only be admitted in exceptional cases of 
qualified need on the basis of the common good. The strict principle does not apply to pending, future, 
conditional and expected rights. In those cases, the interdiction against retroactivity does not impede 
the adoption of rules that affect an ongoing situation only prospectively.
To summarize, both the Supreme and the Constitutional Courts, in their respective spheres of action, 
have considered that the cuts to the incentives do not entail any violation of the constitutional principles 
of legal certainty, legitimate expectations and the prohibition of retroactivity. They have ruled that 
the cuts respond to a public interest duly justified by the legislator and, in particular, that the cuts 
constituted the public authorities’ reaction to the renewable energies technology evolution (rapid 
increase of competitiveness) and were required to fight the tariff deficit and guarantee sustainability 
of the electricity system. Therefore, the measures could not be considered an arbitrary use of public 
power. 
SPAIN AND INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PRESENT SITUATION
Spain has actively participated in the international framework of investment arbitration. It is a member 
of a large number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and also of the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the ECT, as well as of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The 
Hague. Until recently, the number of cases against Spain has been very limited.61
European Union Normative Framework
It is well known that the European Union has assumed competence for the regulation of foreign 
relations regarding investments. Therefore, beyond complying with already existing agreements, Spain 
is no longer free to enter into such agreements on its own.
The new EU competence in this field has begun to be exercised recently with the signing of an EU-
Canada free trade agreement (FTA),62 which includes a full chapter on investment protection. However, 
the introduction of a parallel chapter in the negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP),63 an EU-US FTA, has caused a complex social debate and has led the European 
Commission to work on a proposal for an “investment court system” that has replaced the initially 
agreed-upon text within CETA.64 The social and political movements against ISA may have an influence 
on the ratification of CETA by the European Union and by the national parliaments of its member 
states.65 However, despite a certain amount of social opposition and the present litigious situation, 
the Spanish government has not expressed any concern regarding the incorporation of this issue into 
60 STC 270/2015, supra note 34. 
61 ICSID arbitrations: Maffezini v Spain, Award, 13 November 2000, ICSID Case No ARB/97/7, online: Italaw <www.italaw.com/cases/641>; and 
Inversión y Gestión de Bienes v Spain, Award, 14 August 2015, ICSID Case No ARB/12/17.
62 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union [and its Member States...] (29 
February 2016) [CETA], online: European Commission <trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf>. Translation of the 
legal text of the English version of CETA into French and all other EU official treaty languages is under way.
63 As of September 1, 2016, the TTIP is under negotiation. For more information, see online: <ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/>.
64 EC, Commission, News Release, “CETA: EU and Canada agree on new approach on investment in trade agreement” (29 February 2016), online: 
<trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1468>. The amendment to the agreement suggests a move from the current ad hoc arbitration 
system to a permanent and institutionalized dispute settlement tribunal. The members of the tribunal will no longer be appointed by the investor 
and the state involved in a dispute but will instead be appointed in advance by the parties to the agreement. An appeal system comparable to that 
found in domestic legal systems will be in place, meaning that decisions will be checked for legal correctness and reversed when an error arises.
65 On the issue of the respective competences of the European Union and of its member states to sign an FTA, including an investment chapter (in 
this case, with Singapore), an CJEU opinion is presently pending (Opinion 2/2015).
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the agreements.66 Investment arbitration is accepted, and there is no discussion regarding whether it 
should be abandoned among developed democracies with proper legal and judicial systems.
Renewable Energy Arbitration Cases
As has been seen, national courts provide no opportunity to protect Spanish investments in renewable 
energies. Hence, foreign investors have turned to international investment arbitration against Spain. 
Foreign subsidiaries of Spanish companies have also initiated arbitration procedures against Spain. 
In most cases, they have done so under the ECT, relying on the alleged infringement of the fair and 
equitable treatment of foreign investors as much as on the prohibition of expropriation and measures 
having equivalent effect without fair compensation. The ECT allows resorting to ICSID, the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules and the Arbitration Institute of 
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
As of June 1, 2016, 22 cases had been presented before ICSID67 and three before the Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce, while one is being conducted in an ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules. The 
following table presents the basic data on the cases,68 the majority of which are still pending. 
Table 1: Arbitration Cases Against Spain on Renewable Energy69 70 
UNCITRAL
INVESTOR DATE ARBITRATORS LAW FIRM
PV Investors 17/11/2011 
ECT
Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler (pres), 
Charles Brower, 
Bernardo Sepúlveda-
Amor
Allen & Overy (J. 
Gill, QC, J. Sullivan) 
— 
Spain: Herbert Smith 
Freehills (E. Soler 
Tappa, C. Leathley)
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
INVESTOR DATE ARBITRATORS LAW FIRM
Charanne B.V. (The 
Netherlands) & 
Construction Investments 
S.A.R.L. (Luxembourg) 
--- 
Two Spanish entrepreneurs 
control a Spanish company 
through them (Isolux Corsan 
group69)
2013 
ECT 
— 
AWARD 
21/01/1670
Alexis Mourre (pres), 
Guido Tawil, Claus 
von Wobeser
Bird & Bird; 
Shearman & Sterling; 
Sterling LLP 
(Latham Watkins 
from May 2014) 
— 
Spain: 
Herbert Smith 
Freehills
66 The Spanish position is expressed in a technical document to which the national press had access: “Spain is confident on the possibility to sign 
and provisionally apply the agreement in the issues under EU competence aiming to have it entered into force as soon as possible (before 2017). 
This would be economically and commercially beneficial for both parties.” El País (16 May 2016).
67 A list of ICSID arbitrations against Spain can be found online: <https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/cases/Pages/AdvancedSearch.
aspx?gE=s&rntly=ST127>.
68 Information about the cases in this table may also be found on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website: 
<investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCaseName>.
69 Charanne v Spain, Award, 21 January 2016, Case No 062/2012 (ECT, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce) at para 408 [Charanne].
70 Ibid. 
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Isolux Infrastructure 
Netherlands B.V. 
(participation by a Canadian 
fund) 
(subsidiary of the Spanish 
company Isolux)
ECT Yves Derains (pres), 
Guido S. Tawil, 
Claus von Wobeser
Bird & Bird 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
Abengoa CSP Equity 
Investment S.à.r.l. 
(Luxemburg subsidiary of a 
Spanish company)
June 2013 
ECT
Unknown Cuatrecasas 
Gonçalves Pereira 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
ICSID
INVESTOR DATE ARBITRATORS LAW FIRM
RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) 
Limited (British) & RREEF 
Pan-European Infrastructure 
Two Lux S.à.r.l 
(Luxemburg)
22/11/13 
ARB/13/30 
ECT
Alain Pellet (pres), 
Robert Volterra, 
Pedro Nikken
Allen & Overy 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
Antin Infrastructure 
Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l 
(Luxembourg) & Antin 
Energia Termosolar B.V. 
(Dutch)
22/11/13 
ARB/13/31 
ECT
Francisco Orrego 
Vicuña (investor),  
J. Christopher 
Thomas (Spain)
Allen & Overy 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
EISER Infrastructure 
Limited (Britsh) & Energia 
Solar Luxembourg S.à.r.l 
(Luxemburg)
23/12/13 
ARB/13/36 
ECT
John R. Crook 
(pres), Stanimir 
A. Alexandrov, 
Campbell Alan 
McLachlan
Allen & Overy 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
Masdar Solar & Wind  
Coo-peratief UA 
(Dutch)
11/02/14 
ARB/14/01 
ECT
John Beechey (pres), 
Gary B. Born, 
Brigitte Stern
Allen & Overy 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
NextEra Energy Global 
Holdings B.V. (Dutch), 
NextEra Energy Spain 
Holdings B.V. 
(Dutch)
23/05/14 
ARB 14/11 
ECT
Donald M. McRae 
(pres), L. Yves 
Fortier, Laurence 
Boisson de 
Chazournes
Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
InfraRed Environmental 
Infrastructure G.P. Limited 
and others 
(UK)
3/06/14 
ARB 14/12 
ECT
Stephen L. Drymer 
(pres), William W. 
Park, Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy
Cuatrecasas 
Gonçalves Pereira 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
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RENERGY 
S.à r.l. (Luxembourg)
1/08/14 
ARB/14/18 
ECT
Bruno Simma 
(pres), Christoph H. 
Schreuer, Philippe 
Sands
Cuatrecasas 
Gonçalves Pereira 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
RWE Innogy GmbH 
(German), RWE Innogy 
Aersa S.A.U. (Spanish)
23/12/14 
ARB/14/34 
ECT
Samuel Wordsworth 
(pres), Judd L. 
Kessler, Anna 
Joubin-Bret
Allen & Overy 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
Stadtwerke München 
GmbH, RWE Innogy 
GmbH, RheinEnergie AG, 
AS 3 Beteiligungs GmbH, 
Ferrostaal Industrial Projects 
GmbH, Ferranda GmbH, 
Andasol Fonds GmbH & Co. 
KG, Andasol 3 Kraftwerks 
GmbH (Germans), 
Marquesado Solar S.L. 
(Spanish)
7/01/15 
ARB/15/1 
ECT
Jeswald W. Salacuse 
(pres), Kaj Hober, 
Zachary Douglas 
Allen & Overy 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
STEAG GmbH (German) 21/01/15 
ARB/15/4 
ECT
Clifford Chance 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
9REN Holding S.a.r.l 
(Luxembourg)
21/04/15 
ARB/15/15 
ECT
Ian Binnie (pres), 
David R. Haigh, 
V.V. Veeder
King & Spalding; 
Gomez-Acebo & 
Pombo 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
BayWa r.e. renewable energy 
GmbH (German), BayWa 
r.e. Asset Holding GmbH 
(German)
8/05/15 
ARB/15/16 
ECT
James R. Crawford 
(pres), Horacio 
A. Grigera Naón, 
Loretta Malintoppi
Cuatrecasas 
Gonçalves Pereira 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
Cube Infrastructure 
Fund SICAV, Cube 
Energy S.C.A., Cube 
Infrastructure Managers S.A. 
(Luxembourg), Demeter 2 
FPCI, Demeter Partners S.A. 
(French)
1/06/15 
ARB/15/20 
ECT
Vaughan Lowe 
(pres), James 
Spigelman, Christian 
Tomuschat
King & Spalding; 
Gómez-Acebo & 
Pombo 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
Mathias Kruck, Ralf 
Hofmann, Frank Schumm, 
Joachim Kruck, Peter 
Flachsmann, Rolf Schumm, 
Karsten Reiss, Jürgen Reiss 
(Germans)
4/6/15 
ARB/15/23 
ECT
Vaughan Lowe 
(pres), Gary B. Born, 
Zachary Douglas
King & Spalding; 
Gómez-Acebo & 
Pombo 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
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KS Invest GmbH, TLS Invest 
GmbH (German)
16/6/15 
ARB/15/25 
ECT
Bruno Simma (pres), 
Gary B. Born, Daniel 
Bethlehem
King & Spalding 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
JGC Corporation (Japanese) 22/06/15 
ARB/15/27 
ECT
Hi-Taek Shin (pres), 
Rudolf Dolzer, 
Mónica Pinto
Cuatrecasas, 
Gonçalves Pereira; 
Nagashima Ohno & 
Tsunematsu 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
Cavalum SGPS, S.A. 
(Portuguese)
10/08/15 
ARB/15/34 
ECT
Lawrence Collins 
(pres), David R. 
Haigh, Daniel 
Bethlehem
King & Spalding 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
E.ON SE, E.ON 
Finanzanlagen GmbH, 
E.ON Iberia Holding GmbH 
(Germans)
10/08/15 
ARB/15/35 
ECT
Mark A. Kantor 
(pres), Francisco 
Orrego Vicuña, 
Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes
Luther Rechtsanwalts- 
gesellschaft mbH 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
OperaFund Eco-Invest 
SICAV PLC (Maltese), 
Schwab Holding AG (Swiss)
11/08/15 
ARB/15/36 
ECT
Karl-Heinz 
Böckstiegel (pres), 
August Reinisch, 
Philippe Sands
Cuatrecasas, 
Gonçalves Pereira 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
SolEs Badajoz GmbH 
(German)
24/08/15 
ARB/15/38 
ECT
Joan E. Donoghue 
(pres), Stanimir A. 
Alexandrov, Anna 
Joubin-Bret
Orrick Herrington & 
Sutcliffe; Perez-Llorca 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
Hydro Energy 1 S.à 
r.l. (Luxembourg) and 
Hydroxana Sweden AB 
(Sweden)
19/10/15 
ARB/15/42 
ECT
Lawrence Collins 
(pres), Peter Rees, 
Rolf Knieper
Cuatrecasas, 
Gonçalves Pereira; 
Three Crowns 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
Eurus Energy Holdings 
Corporation (Japanese) & 
Eurus Energy Europe B.V. 
(Dutch)
1/03/2016 
ARB/16/4 
ECT
James R. Crawford 
(pres), Oscar M. 
Garibaldi, Andrea 
Giardina
Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer 
— 
Government Legal 
Service
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It is interesting to note that many of the claimants in Spanish arbitrations are companies established 
in the European Union. The compatibility of BITs with EU law in intra-EU cases has been very much 
an open question. In 2015, the European Commission asked member states (specifically, Austria, the 
Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden) to terminate their intra-EU BITs).71 But not until very 
recently has the CJEU been asked to weigh in on the compatibility of intra-EU BITs and EU law.72 It 
should be noted that, in contrast to the situation with BITs, the European Union, along with its member 
states, is a party to the ECT, under which most of the arbitrations against Spain are initiated. As the 
situation stands, in addition to the Spanish allegations in this realm denying the jurisdiction of the 
arbitral tribunal, the European Commission presented an amicus curiae brief in the Charanne B.V. and 
Construction Investments S.A.R.L. arbitration.73 The award found the brief “very useful” and gave it 
“the most careful consideration,”74 providing a detailed analysis.75 The tribunal had to resolve whether, 
within the dispute, the claimants could be considered investors from their respective states or from the 
European Union. In this regard, the tribunal concluded that, because states and the European Union 
are both equally parties to the ECT, the decision on the claimant’s origin depended on the content of the 
claim and on the entity against which it was filed. The panel concluded that, on this basis, the dispute 
conformed to the ECT jurisdiction criteria. In addition, it established that the ECT does not contain any 
“implicit disconnection clause for intra-EU relationships.”76 What is clear in any case is that it is not for 
the arbitration tribunal to determine the compatibility of the ECT dispute settlement mechanism with 
EU law.77 
Charanne B.V. and Construction Investments S.A.R.L. Award
Charanne B.V. and Construction Investments S.A.R.L are companies based in the Netherlands and 
Luxemburg, respectively, that jointly hold the Spanish company Grupo T-Solar Global S.A. They 
initiated arbitration proceedings against Spain under the ECT before the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce on May 7, 2012. The award was released on January 21, 2016,78 the 
first of the arbitrations to be decided on Spanish renewable energies incentives cuts. The claimants 
alleged Spanish violations of ECT articles 10 and 1379 through RD 1565/201080 and RDL 14/2010,81 
expressly excluding RDL 9/201382 from the scope of their action. 
Arbitral jurisdiction was discussed on a different basis.83 First, Spain alleged that the electa una via 
clause84 applied since the claimants had already presented two demands before Spanish national courts 
(and another one before an international court, the ECHR). However, the claims before Spanish courts 
were presented by Grupo T-Solar Global S.A. Although belonging to the same group — they were 
shareholders — the arbitration claimants were different legal entities and, therefore, the assertion was 
not accepted. For the identity of parties requirement to be met, it would have to be proven that the 
claimants held decision-making power within Grupo T-Solar Global S.A.85 Spain also argued that, 
piercing the corporate veil, it was clear that the Luxembourg and Netherlands companies were owned 
71 EC, Commission, Press Release, “Commission asks Member States to terminate their intra-EU bilateral investment treaties” (18 June 2015), 
online: <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5198_en.htm>. 
72 In May 2016, the German Federal Court of Justice [Bundesgerichtshof] requested that the CJEU give a ruling on the validity of arbitration 
agreements in BITs between member states. Information on the case (Achema (Eureko) v Slovakia) can be found in “Intra-EU BITs Before the 
Court of Justice of the EU” (24 May 2015) (blog), online: Global Investment Protection <www.globalinvestmentprotection.com/index.php/intra-
eu-bits-before-the-court-of-justice-of-the-eu/>. 
73 Charanne, supra note 69. This case is discussed in more detail below.
74 Ibid at para 425.
75 Ibid at paras 424–450.
76 Ibid at para 433.
77 Ibid at para 440 et seq.
78 Ibid. The award, in Spanish, is available online: <www.energycharter.org/what-we-do/dispute-settlement/investment-dispute-settlement-
cases/34-charanne-the-netherlands-and-construction-investments-luxembourg-v-spain/> and an English translation can be found online at: 
<www.minetur.gob.es/es-es/gabineteprensa/notasprensa/2013/documents/laudo%20final%20arbritaje%20en%20ingles.pdf>. 
79 ECT, supra note 36.
80 RD 1565/2010, 19 November, which regulates and modifies certain aspects pertaining to the electrical energy production activity under a special 
regime (BOE No 283, 97428 (23 November 2010)).
81 RDL 14/2010, supra note 19.
82 RDL 9/2013, supra note 26.
83 On a related issue, the tribunal discussed the fact that the investors and the defendant country, apart from being within the special application 
criteria of the ECT, were also parties to an economically integrated area that, in itself, was a party to the ECT. The issue will not be addressed 
here because it is of peripheral relevance for the purpose of this paper: Charanne, supra note 69 at paras 424–50.
84 ECT, supra note 36, art 26. 
85 Charanne, supra note 69 at paras 405-406, 408.
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by Spanish nationals and, therefore, they could not be considered investors according to the ECT.86 It 
is undisputed that the notion of “investor” applies to legal persons organized in accordance with the 
law applicable in an ECT contracting party. Piercing the corporate veil and ignoring the investor’s 
legal personality is conceivable in the event of a jurisdictional fraud; however, fraud would have to 
be proven.87 Finally, Spain also argued there is discrimination between Spanish investors within the 
country and Spanish investors who own foreign companies, because only the latter have access to 
investment arbitration.
Equality and non-discrimination on the basis of national constitutions and international conventions in 
the investment arbitration landscape have been widely discussed by civil society activists. Together with 
other arguments, these discussions have helped to support the idea of restricting the use of investment 
arbitration to countries with developed or trustworthy judicial systems. However, it seemed clear that 
within this arbitration procedure — and any other — the discrimination argument could not, and did 
not, succeed because jurisdiction was established on the basis of the investment treaty,88 which in itself 
would be the basis of the alleged discrimination.
Regarding the prohibition against indirect expropriation,89 the arbitration tribunal noted first that the 
investment made by the claimants consisted of their indirect stake in the company Grupo T-Solar S.A.; 
hence, the protected investments were not the expected returns, but the shares.90 It was undisputed 
that the shares’ ownership had not been affected. The dispute concerned the decrease in the shares’ 
value due to the reduced profitability of the company. To become an expropriation, the shares’ loss of 
value “has to be so large that it equals a deprivation of property”: in other words, “its effects have to 
be so significant that it can be considered that the investor has been deprived, in full or in part, of its 
investment.”91 A mere decrease in the value of the shares can only qualify as an indirect expropriation 
“if the loss of value is such that it could be considered equivalent to a deprivation of property,” and this 
was not the case when the estimated loss was 10 percent.92
Regarding the obligations for the promotion, protection and treatment of investments,93 the main 
discussion focused on fair and equitable treatment and the violation of the complainants’ rights through 
the retroactive application of the Spanish legislative measures. As to fair and equitable treatment, 
which includes the duty to create a stable, equitable, favourable and transparent environment for 
member states’ investors, the arbitration tribunal had to consider whether the changes to the regulatory 
framework (up to 2010) amounted to the frustration of the investors’ legitimate expectations. In this 
regard, based on the good faith principle under customary international law and referring to a 2012 
UNCTAD study on fair and equitable treatment,94 the tribunal analyzed whether Spain had launched 
an investment promotion campaign that provided specific commitments to the claimants or created the 
legitimate expectations that the normative system would not be changed. It was clear to the tribunal 
that the regulations establishing the incentive regime could not be considered specific commitments 
to the claimants because, despite having a specific scope of application, the subject of which was the 
targets, the regulations did not lose their general character of regulatory measures.95 However, in the 
86 ECT, supra note 36, art 1.7. 
87 Charanne, supra note 69 at paras 414-415, 417. Citing the Yukos award (Yukos Universal Ltd (Isle of Man) v Russia, Interim Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 30 November 2009, PCA Case No AA 227 (ECT, UNCITRAL), online: Italaw <www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0910.pdf>) at para 415, the tribunal stated that it “knows of no general principle of international law that would require 
investigating how a company or another organization operates when the applicable treaty simply requires it to be organized in accordance with 
the laws of a contracting party” (Ibid at para 417).
88 Ibid at para 420.
89 ECT, supra note 36, art 13.
90 Charanne, supra note 69 at paras 458-59.
91 Ibid at paras 464-65.
92 Ibid at paras 465-66.
93 ECT, supra note 36, art 10. For the purposes of this paper, the issue of the alleged violations of the effective means for the assertion of claims 
has peripheral relevance and, therefore, will not be discussed: Charanne, supra note 69 at paras 468–74.
94 UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II (New York: UN, 2012), online: 
<unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf>. The study established that “an investor may derive legitimate expectations either from (a) 
specific commitments addressed to it personally, for example in the form of a stabilization clause, or (b) rules that are not specifically addressed 
to a particular investor but which are put in place with a specific aim to induce foreign investments and on which the foreign investor relied in 
making his investment” (Ibid at 69).
95 Charanne, supra note 69 at paras 490–93.
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dissenting opinion, Guido Santiago Tawil considered that the regulations were aimed at a limited 
number of recipients, that is, the pool of potential interested investors.96
Legitimate expectations, under international law, have to be based on an objective data analysis 
and must be reasonable in the specific circumstances. Analyzing the relevant data (documents) and 
considering that states maintain their regulatory capacity when circumstances change (along this line, 
there was clear and well-established Spanish jurisprudence), the tribunal concluded that the claimants 
could not have reasonably expected that the incentives (tariffs in particular) would remain unchanged 
unless there had been a specific commitment. Normative modifications in changed circumstances 
were foreseeable.97 However, the dissenting arbitrator considered that the absence of a state-specific 
commitment toward the claimants did not preclude the existence of legitimate expectations on the 
maintenance of the tariffs. The expectations would derive from the legal system in force at the time of 
the investment, together with other documents issued contemporaneously by the Spanish government 
because they “appear to be determining factors for the Claimants to decide to carry out the investment.”98
When the regulations were changed, the protection of legitimate expectations principle required these 
changes to be proportionate. The majority of the arbitration tribunal considered that “the proportionality 
requirement is fulfilled as long as the modifications are not random or unnecessary and…they do not 
suddenly and unexpectedly eliminate the essential features of the regulatory framework in place.”99 The 
tribunal found the Spanish arguments convincing because, overall, the 2010 regulations “implemented 
adjustments and adaptations that did not eliminate the essential characteristics of the existing regulatory 
framework,” could not “be deemed as irrational” and were not “contrary to the public interest.”100 
The claimants had not provided any evidence to the contrary. Therefore, “no legitimate expectation 
whatsoever under international law could have been defeated.”101
As to retroactivity and the companies’ claims that their vested rights had been violated, the arbitration 
tribunal perceived this argument as “a mere rewording of the argument that the State could not alter 
in any way the regulatory framework from which the Claimants’ plants benefited” and stated that “it 
is undisputed that the 2010 regulations applied immediately, from their entry into force, to the plants 
already in operation, and that they did not apply retroactively to previous time periods…. [T]here is no 
principle of international law preventing a State from adopting regulatory measures with immediate 
effect on ongoing situations.”102
Although in Charanne the Spanish government’s views prevailed, outcomes could vary in the pending 
cases. Beyond the obvious fact that they are different arbitrations, it has to be recalled that RDL 9/2013103 
was expressly excluded from Charanne. Further, the dissenting opinion clearly shows a different 
understanding and interpretation of the legitimate expectations requirement. It seems clear that, within 
the international investment legal framework, states retain the ability to modify their legal systems (in 
the words of the dissenting arbitrator, “no vested right to the continuance of a specific general legal 
regime exists, nor does a legitimate expectation regarding the stability of laws and regulations”104) but 
are obliged to compensate investors when changes in the legal environment unjustifiably, and without 
adequate compensation, prejudice the investment — that is, if they affect investors’ vested rights or 
legitimate expectations.105 However, diverse interpretations remain regarding when those changes 
affect legitimate expectations. Although it is agreed that the legitimate expectations test is to be based 
on objective data, its interpretation may lead to opposing conclusions.
96 Charanne v Spain, Award, 21 January 2016, Case No 062/2012 (ECT, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce), Tawil, dissenting, at para 8 [Charanne 
Dissent]. 
97 Charanne, supra note 69 at paras 495–511. For a non-modification expectation to reasonably exist, the arbitral tribunal would require a specific 
commitment. The tribunal included citations to several ECT awards based on this reasoning.
98 Charanne Dissent, supra note 96 at paras 5-6.
99 Charanne, supra note 69 at para 517.
100 Ibid at para 527.
101 Ibid at paras 533-35.
102 Ibid at paras 546-48.
103 RDL 9/2013, supra note 26.
104 Charanne Dissent, supra note 96 at para 11. 
105 Ibid.
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CONCLUSIONS
The resolution of the pending arbitration cases is of extraordinary interest, not only for the economic 
consequences of the rulings but also for the evaluation of the legitimacy of Spanish normative measures 
reducing, from 2010 up to their elimination in 2013, the incentives for the production of electricity on by 
means of renewable energies that had been established in 2004 and 2007. Whether on the basis of the 
Spanish constitution or on the basis of the ECT — or a BIT — the decisions will establish whether the 
normative changes entail an indirect expropriation or a violation of the legal certainty principle and its 
corollary, the protection of legitimate expectations. The Spanish government maintains that it had the 
authority to modify the regulations under the circumstances. 
Looking at the Spanish jurisprudence and the first arbitral award that has been released, it seems 
that the understanding of the rules and principles under the ECT is not far from that of the Spanish 
Constitutional and Supreme Courts regarding prohibition of the retroactive effect of the rights-
restricting norms and compliance with the legal certainty and legitimate expectations principles. In 
this regard, it is interesting to note that Spanish jurisprudence follows CJEU case law. 
Although it is most improbable that in future cases Spanish courts will evaluate the situation differently, 
in the investment arbitration scenario, the situation could be quite different. The reasons lie, first, in the 
different contexts of the cases and the autonomy of each arbitration tribunal and, second, in the different 
understanding and interpretation of the legitimate expectations test criteria (the criteria themselves 
are well established). Although the existence of this understanding provides for legal certainty in any 
investment dispute, it does not — and probably cannot — guarantee a consistent evaluation of the 
circumstances in investment arbitration proceedings, as the dissenting opinion in Charanne shows. 
With the renewable energies arbitration “explosion,” there is still much to be seen.
As to the effect of the renewable energies situation in the investment arbitration debate within Spanish 
civil society, three aspects are significant. The first is the differential treatment (discrimination) of 
national and foreign investors. Although Spanish investors have suffered the same consequences of the 
normative reforms as foreign investors, they do not have access to arbitration. Foreign investors, even 
those owned by Spanish nationals or companies, do have the arbitration option. In this regard, and 
on the basis of material equality, the Spanish ombudsman has recommended that the energy ministry 
adopt the necessary measures so that Spanish citizens are not treated less favourably than foreigners.106 
Second, states’ attorneys have been forced to develop their expertise in investment arbitration, an 
area in which they had little previous experience. In this regard, a particularly sensitive issue is that 
numerous Spanish state attorneys have been hired by major law firms to defend investors’ interests in at 
least 12 cases, with the attorneys thereby leaving aside, at least temporarily, their primary professional 
commitment to the Spanish administration.107 This leads to the third issue: the concentration of big 
business around investment arbitration. Only a few law firms are involved in the defence of all the 
cases and some arbitrators sit on various panels. All this generates a social reaction against investment 
arbitration that might be reinforced if and when any of the extremely expensive pending arbitrations 
result in rulings against Spain on facts that, up to now, have not resulted in compensation for any 
national investor. 
At this time, however, there is no well-developed academic or political discussion in Spain regarding 
whether investment arbitration should be abandoned, at least not among developed democracies with 
proper legal and judicial systems. Investment arbitration continues to receive governmental support, 
although the legality of intra-EU cases is under question and awaits the response of the CJEU.
106 Recommendation to the Spanish energy ministry, May 16, 2014, that was rejected by the ministry: “Discriminación de los inversores españoles en 
su acceso al arbitraje internacional, ante la modificación del régimen retributivo de la energía fotovoltaica,” online: <www.defensordelpueblo.es/
resoluciones/discriminacion-de-los-inversores-espanoles-en-su-acceso-al-arbitraje-internacional-ante-la-modificacion-del-regimen-retributivo-
de-la-energia-fotovoltaica-2/>.
107 Rafael Méndez, “Abogados del Estado pleitean contra España fichados por fondos ‘verdes’,” El País, 5 July 2015. (Interestingly, a number of 
Spanish state attorneys and their teams were trained in Canada.)
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